The Gaussian quantum key distribution protocol based on coherent states and heterodyne detection [Phys. Rev. Lett. 93, 170504 (2004)] has the advantage that no active random basis switching is needed on the receiver's side. Its security is, however, not very satisfyingly understood today because the bounds on the secret key rate that have been derived from Heisenberg relations are not attained by any known scheme. Here, we address the problem of the optimal Gaussian individual attack against this protocol, and derive tight upper bounds on the information accessible to an eavesdropper. The optical scheme achieving this bound is also exhibited, which concludes the security analysis of this protocol.
I. INTRODUCTION
Over the past few years, an important research effort has been devoted to continuous-variable quantum key distribution (QKD) protocols, motivated by the prospects of realizing high-rate cryptosystems relying on homodyne detection instead of photon counting. These systems also have the advantage that they are based on standard (low-cost) telecom optical components, circumventing the need for single-photon sources nor singlephoton detectors. In particular, Gaussian QKD protocols have been extensively investigated first because they are conceptually simpler, but also mainly because their security can be rigorously assessed. The first proposed Gaussian QKD protocol used squeezed states of light, which are modulated in one or the other quadrature (x or p) by the emitter (Alice), and are measured via homodyne detection by the receiver (Bob) [1] . Although this protocol is a very natural continuous-variable counterpart of the famous BB84 protocol, its main drawback is the need for a source of squeezed light.
A second Gaussian QKD protocol was devised, in which Alice generates coherent states (instead of squeezed states) which are then modulated both in x and p, while Bob still performs homodyne detection [2] . Dealing with coherent states of light (simply produced with a laser) instead of squeezed or single-photon states makes this protocol very practical. This protocol, supplemented with the technique of reverse reconciliation, was experimentally demonstrated in Ref. [3] , where it was shown that its range can, in principle, be arbitrarily large. Note that, in these two protocols, Bob randomly chooses to homodyning one quadrature, either x or p. In the squeezed-state protocol, Bob then needs to reject the instances where he measured the other quadrature than the one modulated by Alice (this operation is called sifting), which results in a decrease of the key rate by a factor 2 [13] . In the coherent-state protocol, Alice simply forgets the quadrature that is not measured by Bob, which may look like a loss of efficiency. A third Gaussian protocol was therefore proposed, in which Alice still transmits doubly-modulated coherent states but Bob performs heterodyne measurements, that is, he measures both quadratures x and p simultaneously [4] (this possibility was also suggested for postselection-based protocols in [5] ). At first sight, this seems to imply that the rate is doubled, since Bob then acquires a pair of quadratures (x, p). Actually, since heterodyne measurement effects one additional unit of vacuum noise on the measured quadratures, the two quadratures received by Bob are noisier than the single quadrature in the homodynebased protocol. The net effect, however, is generally an increase of the key rate when the two quadratures are measured simultaneously [14] .
This third protocol thus exhibits two advantages, namely that (i) the key rate is generally higher than for the homodyne-based coherent-state protocol, and (ii) there is no need to choose a random quadrature (i.e., no active basis choice is needed) at Bob's side. However, in order to make any definite statement on the security of this protocol, it is necessary to put precise limits on the maximum information accessible to an eavesdropper (Eve). Surprisingly, although bounds on the optimal Gaussian individual attack against this protocol had been derived in [4] , it has remained unknown until now whether these bounds can be attained or not by an explicit eavesdropping strategy. These bounds were derived using similar techniques to those used for the other Gaussian protocols, namely by writing Heisenberg uncertainty relations. Since for the protocols based on homodyne detection, the corresponding Heisenberg bounds can be attained by use of an explicit transformation (the entangling cloner), it is tempting to conclude that the same is true for the heterodyne-based protocol. On the other hand, since no explicit scheme has been found to date that saturates these bounds, another possibility is that these are loose, and tighter bounds remain to be found.
In this paper, we revisit the security of this coherentstate heterodyne-based Gaussian protocol, and prove that the second above option is indeed true. We seek for the optimal Gaussian individual attack by expressing the most general symplectic transformation characterizing Eve's action and maximizing the information acquired by her. Restricting to symplectic transformations is actually sufficient given that Gaussian attacks are provably optimal among individual attacks [6] . We conclude that this optimal attack is less powerful than expected, in the sense that we derive a tighter bound than that based on the Heisenberg inequalities. We also exhibit optical schemes that precisely attain this bound, both in direct and reverse reconciliation. Hence, the resulting lower bound on the secret key rate is higher than that based on the Heisenberg uncertainty relations, making the heterodyne-based protocol even more efficient than originally thought.
II. HEISENBERG-LIMITED EAVESDROPPING
The Gaussian protocol based on coherent states and heterodyne detection [4] can be shown to be equivalent to an entanglement-based scheme [7] , where Alice prepares an EPR state and applies an heterodyne measurement on mode A, while Bob applies an heterodyne measurement on mode B. This is shown in Fig. 1 . We restrict ourselves to individual attacks, where Eve completely controls the Alice-to-Bob channel separately for each transmitted state. Since Gaussian attacks are optimal among these attacks, we consider in what follows that Eve effects a Gaussian channel [15] . Consequently, the quantum state ρ AB before Alice and Bob's measurements can be assumed to be a Gaussian two-mode state with a zero mean value and a covariance matrix γ AB . Usual Gaussian channels, such as optical fibers, effect a symmetric and uncorrelated noise in both quadratures x and p (including, of course, the loss-induced noise), so that we will only consider symmetric channels without x-p correlations in what follows. Since the EPR state (two-mode squeezed state) is also symmetric and exhibits no correlations between x and p, we can write the resulting covariance matrix in a block-diagonal form as
where the signs + and − correspond to γ In order to address the security of this protocol, we may, without loss of generality, assume that Eve holds the purification of the quantum state ρ AB . By measuring their systems, Bob and Eve then project Alice's share of the joint pure state |Ψ ABE onto another pure state [16] . Applying the Heisenberg uncertainty relation on the pure state held by Alice (conditioning on Bob and Eve's measurements), we have
where X A and P A are the canonically conjugate quadratures of Alice's mode and V X|Y is the conditional variance measuring the remaining uncertainty on X after the measurement of Y ,
expressed in shot-noise units. Equation (3) also has a symmetric counterpart that reads,
Since we focus on a symmetric noise in x and p, Eqs. (3) and (5) can be unified into a single uncertainty relation
where A stands for any quadrature (X A or P A ) of Alice's mode. This inequality will be used to put a lower bound on the uncertainty of Eve's estimate of the key in Direct Reconciliation (DR), that is, when the key is made out of Alice's data while Bob and Eve compete to estimate it. Similarly, in Reverse Reconciliation (RR), that is, when the key is made out of Bob's data while Alice and Eve compete to estimate it, one can derive a dual inequality
where B stands for any quadrature of Bob's mode. This will be used to put a lower bound on the uncertainty of Eve's estimate of the key in RR.
Now, we will derive lower bounds on the secret key rates using the above uncertainty relations on the variances, similarly as in Ref. [4] . Restricting to individual attacks and one-way reconciliation, the DR and RR secret key rates for each of the two quadratures read
where H(.) is the Shannon entropy, and E stands for Eve's optimal measurement maximizing her information (which is not necessarily the same in DR and RR 
derived later on are the sum of the above expressions for x and p. If we assume that the channel is Gaussian, we can express the conditional entropies in Eqs. (8) and (9) in terms of conditional variances, so that the above Heisenberg inequalities on conditional variances directly translate into bounds on the secret key rates.
A. Direct reconciliation
The problem of estimating Bob's uncertainty on Alice's measurements
A knowing that the other one is also measured) can be reduced to estimating Bob's uncertainty on each of the quadratures of mode A (X A , P A ) since Alice's measurements result from mixing mode A with vacuum on a balanced beam splitter, see Fig. 1 . Using Eqs. (1) and (4), one gets
where B stands for the same quadrature of mode B (X B or P B ). Similarly, using Eq. (4), and the fact that (
which can then be converted into the variance of Bob's estimate of Alice's key
Using V A|E = 1/V A|B for the optimal eavesdropping (since Bob may have performed homodyne detection and measured one single quadrature), one gets for Eve's uncertainty on her estimate of Alice's key
The secret key rate then reads,
Note that we have a factor two with respect to Eq. (8) because the key is extracted from both quadratures X M A
and P M A .
B. Reverse reconciliation
Similarly, one can show that V B|A = T (χ + 1/V ) and V B|A M = T (χ+1), so that the variance of Alice's estimate of Bob's data is
while, using V B|E = 1/V B|A (Alice may have performed homodyne instead of heterodyne detection), one gets for Eve's uncertainty
We have a factor two with respect to Eq. (9) because the key is extracted from both quadratures X M B and P M B .
III. OPTIMAL GAUSSIAN EAVESDROPPING
The entangling cloner, that is, the optimal attack against the homodyne-based protocols [7] , is clearly not optimal here as it allows to extract information about one single quadrature. We may think of adapting it by applying an heterodyne detection on the mode that is entangled with the mode injected in the line (as well as on the output mode of Eve's beamsplitter simulating the losses). However, this is equivalent to having a classical source of noise controlled by Eve, so that the optimal V A(B)|E that Eve can reach coincides with the beamsplitter attack, which does not saturate (14) nor (17) as the excess noise ǫ only affects Alice and Bob mutual information but does not help Eve to reduce any uncertainty.
Since the time when the heterodyne-based protocol was introduced [4] , no attack has been found saturating bounds (14) and (17). Logically, two possibilities remain open: (i) these bounds are tight but the optimal attacks reaching them remain to be found; (ii) these bound are not tight and the (unknown) optimal attacks can not saturate them. In order to answer this question, we need to search for the optimal attack against this protocol with respect to all possible (individual Gaussian) attacks that Eve can do. Although we are dealing with an infinite-dimensional Hilbert space, this task remains tractable because of the fact that Gaussian states and operations have a simple characterization in terms of firstand second-order moments of the quadratures. We thus need to find among all possible linear canonical transformations the one which optimizes Eve's information either on Alice's data (DR) or on Bob's data (RR). Some symmetries also simplify the solution of this problem. Before searching for the optimal attack, let us consider these simplifications.
Eve's Gaussian attack and the number of ancillae
As we restrict Eve's attacks to Gaussian operations, it is trivial to see that Eve must apply a Gaussian unitary transformation on the mode sent by Alice together with her ancillae, as shown in Fig. 2 . Indeed, applying a Gaussian completely positive maps instead of a unitary operation (i.e., discarding some ancillae) can only make Eve loose information on the secret key. The number of ancillae that Eve needs is determined as follows. First, it is easy to see that Eve needs at least two ancillary modes to estimate either Alice's (DR) or Bob's (RR) quadratures, since one is needed to get x, the other to get p. Let us give an argument why these two ancillary modes are actually sufficient to implement the optimal attack. In the entanglement-based description, Eve holds the purification of ρ AB , and therefore can be restricted to occupy the same number of modes as ρ AB , see [8] . One should then be able to recover the entanglement-based scheme of Fig. 2 by applying a local unitary operation on Eve's side, since all purifications are equivalent up to a unitary operation on Eve's side.
Thus, the optimal Gaussian attack we seek for corresponds, in the Heisenberg picture, to a symplectic transformation S acting jointly on Alice's mode B 0 and Eve's ancillary modes E 1 and E 2 , that is where the superscript (0) is used to indicate that the corresponding state is the vacuum. Then, Eve's optimal measurement on her two modes E ≡ E 1 E 2 can be assumed to be a homodyne measurement on these two modes in order to estimate either (x A , p A ) in DR or (x B , p B ) in RR.
Symmetric channel without x-p correlations
The symplectic transformation S can be written without loss of generality in a bloc-diagonal form as
where S x and S p are related by the relation
in order to preserve the canonical commutation relations. Indeed, we start with an initial Gaussian state of covariance matrix γ AB0 ⊕ 1 1 E1E2 , which is of the same form as Eq. (1). More precisely, it is symmetric in x and p and admits no correlations between x and p. After Eve's Gaussian operation, we have a Gaussian state for modes A and B, which, by Schmidt decomposition, can be purified into a Gaussian 4-mode state by extending the system with modes E 1 and E 2 [8] . This can be understood by applying a symplectic decomposition on modes A and B that converts their joint state into a product of two thermal states. These thermal states can then be written as the reduction of EPR states, shared with Eve's modes E 1 and E 2 . Since this symplectic decomposition does not mix the x and p quadratures, the covariance matrix of the 4-mode pure state is again of the same form as Eq. (1). Hence, the symplectic transformation S applied by the eavesdropper does not mix the x and p quadratures. We would like to stress that this form, Eq. (19), is not an assumption but rather a simplification originating from the fact that the channels of interest effect symmetric uncorrelated noise in x and p, as mentioned above.
The entry of the matrix γ x AB corresponding to x 2 B = T (V +χ) provides constraints on the first row of S x , since we need to havê
where θ ∈ [0, 2π] is a free parameter. Remember that x 2 B0 = x 2 A = V . Thus, we can write S x in general as
where {a, b, c, r, s, t} ∈ R are six other free parameters. Using Equation (20), we can rewrite S p as
where d = det(S x ). Given the symmetry of the channel, the entry of γ p AB corresponding to p 2 B = T (V + χ) provides a constraint on the first row of S p , in a similar way as for S x . This yields the three conditions
where φ ∈ [0, 2π] is a free parameter. Finally, due to the symmetry of the channel in x and p, we consider that Eve's optimal attack gives her the same uncertainty in x and p.
A. Direct reconciliation
As before, Eve's uncertainty on Alice's measurements
can be calculated from the uncertainty of Eve on each of the two quadratures of mode A (X A , P A ). We have, for example,
, and similarly for the p quadrature. The symmetry of Eve's information on X A and P A imposes that
Writing the second-order moments of A and E 1 ,
and plugging them into Eq. (4), we obtain
Similarly, one has for the p quadrature
Finally, as a consequence of Eq. (25) we can write
where
Given Eq. (21), we see that ρ is proportional to the signalto-noise ratio of the Alice-to-Eve channel (more precisely, the latter signal-to-noise ratio equals ρV ). Thus, by definition, ρ ≥ 0. Moreover, we can write in analogy with Eq. (3) the Heisenberg uncertainty relation
which, together with Eq. (25), implies that V A|E ≥ 1, or, equivalently, ρ ≤ 1. Note that the Heisenberg-limited attack in DR corresponds simply to choose ρ = χ.
We will now prove that such a choice is not possible, that is, it is not consistent with the constraints we have on the matrices S x and S p . In order to further simplify S x , we introduce the following change of variables,
Using the variables r ′ , s ′ , t ′ as defined in Eq. (23) and the expression of ρ in terms of these variables, Eq. (32), we then obtain
Using the symmetry of the channel, Eq. (24), and the explicit expression of d = det S x , we obtain a second similar equation
Expressing the equality between Eqs. (35) and (36) yields two solutions. The first one, namely ρχ = −(1 − T )/T , is unphysical since T ≤ 1, ρ ≥ 0, and χ ≥ 0. The second one yields Furthermore, injecting Eq. (37) into Eq. (36) gives
Finally, the relation cos 2 (ξ + θ) + sin 2 (ξ + θ) = 1 provides us with a second-order equation in ρ,
which always admits two solutions for a given channel (i.e. given parameters T and χ),
Looking at Eq. (31), we see that minimizing V A|E is equivalent to maximizing ρ, that is, choosing ρ + . Thus, Eve's minimum uncertainty on Alice's measurement reads,
and the lower bound on the DR secret key rate reads
Interestingly, Eq. (41) is similar to its counterpart for the Heisenberg-limited attack, Eq. (13), but with ρ + replacing χ. It can easily be checked that ρ + < χ, so that the highest possible signal-to-noise ratio of the Alice-toEve channel is strictly lower than the one deduced from Heisenberg uncertainty relations. Hence, Eve's optimal attack is less powerful than expected from Heisenberg relations.
This is illustrated in Fig. 3 , where the secret key rates have been plotted for experimental realistic values of V and ǫ. The lower bound deduced from the Heisenberg relations is satisfied, but loose with respect to the actual key rate.
B. Reverse reconciliation
Combining Eqs. (18) and (22), we obtain the secondorder moments of B and E 1
This results in
where we have used Eq. (4). Similarly, using the symmetry of the channel, Eq. (24), we can write,
Imposing the symmetry of Eve's information on X B and P B in analogy with Eq. (25), that is,
gives the three conditions
Note that condition (49) is exactly the same as in direct reconciliation. Surprisingly, it so happens that this condition is sufficient to find an expression for V B|E which is the same as in direct reconciliation, making it unnecessary to use the other two conditions. Indeed, Eve's uncertainty on the quadratures of mode B can be rewritten as
(52) Then, using the definition of sin(ξ + θ) coming from Eq. (37) as well as Eq. (39), we obtain
which gives V B|E = V A|E . Therefore, just like in direct reconciliation, Eve's uncertainty on the quadratures of mode B is minimized by choosing ρ + ,
Then, Eve's uncertainty on Bob's measured values becomes
so that the RR secret key rate reads
This rate is illustrated in Fig. 3 , where it is compared with the lower bound deduced from the Heisenberg relations in RR. We conclude again that the Heisenberglimited attack is not reachable. For illustration, we compare in Fig. 4 the secret key rate of the coherent-state homodyne-based protocol to that of the present coherent-state heterodyne-based protocol in direct and reverse reconciliation [Eqs. (42) and (57)]. For realistic parameters V and ǫ, we notice that the heterodyne-based protocol always yields higher rates than the homodyne-based protocol in RR. This also means that the maximum tolerable excess noise ǫ in RR is higher with the heterodyne-based protocol regardless the losses. In DR, the heterodyne-based protocol gives an advantage over the homodyne-based protocol only for line losses below some threshold. This threshold can be shown to decrease for increasing ǫ, so that the maximum tolerable noise is actually higher for the homodyne-based protocol in DR. 
IV. OPTICAL SETUP ACHIEVING THE BEST GAUSSIAN ATTACK
In Section III, we have reduced the problem of maximizing Eve's information to that of optimizing a single parameter ρ, the other parameters remaining free. This implies that the optical implementation of the best Gaussian attack is not unique. In this Section, we present two particularly interesting examples of such an optical implementation, namely the teleportation attack and the "feed-forward" attack. Note that the latter attack was also considered in Ref. [4] , where it was noticed that it curiously does not reach the Heisenberg limit.
A. Teleportation attack
The teleportation attack consists in Eve applying a continuous-variable quantum teleportation where the input is Alice's outgoing mode and the output is given to Bob, as shown in Fig. 5 . Eve extracts information from the outcomes (X ). This situation corresponds to an entanglement-breaking channel giving no secret key. On the contrary, if the squeezing factor r is infinite, the teleportation succeeds perfectly and Eve gets no information at all due to the infinite noise in the thermal state E ′ 1 . This situation corresponds to a perfect channel with no losses and no excess noise (T = 1, ǫ = 0). We will now show that for any intermediate value of r, such a teleportation attack can be made optimal.
Since all the involved canonical transformations are 2 ) by mixing a x-squeezed vacuum state (E2) with a p-squeezed vacuum state (E1) at a balanced beamsplitter. Then, she performs a Bell measurement on Alice's outgoing mode B0 together with E ′ 1 . Depending on the measurement outcome and the fixed gain gE, she then displaces mode E ′ 2 by x (Dx) and p (Dp). The resulting state is sent to Bob. By tuning the squeezing parameter r and the gain gE, Eve can simulate any Gaussian channel (T, χ) and extract the optimal amount of information.
symmetric in x and p, we will detail the proof for the x quadrature only. Eve starts by preparing two squeezed vacuum states, one in mode E 2 (squeezed in x) and the other is mode E 1 (squeezed in p),
and mixes them on a balanced beamsplitter, thereby generating an EPR statê
Eve then applies a Bell measurement by mixing E ′ 1 and B 0 on a balanced beamsplitter, and measuring x on one output and p on the other,
(62) Next, Eve displaces her mode E ′ 2 by an amount proportional to the measurement outcome X M E (multiplied by the classical gain g E ) and sends it to Bob, givinĝ
In order to comply with x 2 B = T (V + χ), we need to fix g E and r in such a way that
1. Direct reconciliation.
Writing the second-order moments ofx A andx E , namely
(67)
one can show, using Eq. (4), that Eve's uncertainty on Alice's data is
By choosing
this expression for V A|E coincides with Eq. (31). Combining Eq. (65) with the relation cosh 2 2r − sinh 2 2r = 1, we see that ρ must satisfy the second-order polynomial equation (39), whose solution gives the value of ρ that optimizes Eve's information. Equation (39) having two possible solutions ρ ± generating the same quantum channel (T, χ), we then have two possible solutions for the squeezing parameter r. Looking at Eq. (70), we see that that the squeezing parameter corresponding to the optimal choice ρ + is the lowest of the two solutions since it corresponds to the minimum added noise on Eve's measurement.
Reverse reconciliation.
Using Eqs. (4), (65), (67), and
one can show that Eve's uncertainty on each of Bob's quadratures reads
implying that the teleportation attack is also optimal (choosing the lowest squeezing parameter) for the reverse reconciliation protocol.
B. Feed-forward attack
In the case of a noisy channels with no losses (T = 1) and direct reconciliation, Eve's optimal teleportation attack is exactly the same scheme as the one proposed in Ref. [9] to reach an optimal tradeoff between disturbance and state estimation for coherent states (when the success of both processes is measured using the fidelity). This is not surprising since optimally estimating the coherent state sent by Alice while minimizing its disturbance is exactly what Eve attempts to achieve in her optimal attack in direct reconciliation. In Ref. [9] , two alternative schemes to the teleportation reaching the same optimal tradeoff were also presented, the "feedforward" attack and the asymmetric cloning machine. Those two schemes can very naturally be extended to our case (T ≤ 1) if we allow for different mean values for the input and output modes, which gives rise to new optical schemes for the optimal attack.
For example, it can be checked that Eve can realize an optimal attack (both in DR and RR) using the "feedforward" scheme described in Fig. 6 by fixing the parameters of the beamsplitter transmittance G and the feed-forward gain g E as
V. CONCLUSION
We have revisited the security of the Gaussian quantum cryptographic protocol with no basis switching (with Alice sending coherent states and Bob performing heterodyne measurements) introduced in Ref. [4] . We have considered the most general Gaussian individual attack against this protocol by characterizing an arbitrary symplectic transformation and maximizing Eve's information over all such transformations. We have found that, in contrast with all other Gaussian protocols that had been studied so far, no attack exists that attains the security bounds deduced from the Heisenberg uncertainty relations, making these bounds unreachable in the present case. A tight bound was derived, both in direct and reverse reconciliation, and several explicit optical schemes that attain this bound have been exhibited. Remarkably, this makes the coherent-state heterodyne-based Gaussian protocol better than what was implicitly assumed in the original analysis [4] .
We may wonder what is so special about this noswitching protocol? As a matter of fact, in the two Gaussian protocols based on homodyne detection, one of the two quadratures plays a special role, namely the one that is measured by Bob (provided, in the squeezedstate protocol, that it is also the one modulated by Alice; otherwise the instance is discarded). The Heisenberg uncertainty relations then express that any action on this quadrature, which carries the key, translates into some additional noise on the dual quadrature. Monitoring the noise on this dual quadrature then puts an upper limit on the information potentially acquired by Eve on the key-carrying quadrature. This simple and very intuitive interpretation fails for the heterodyne-based protocol because then both quadratures must be treated together (Alice modulates both quadratures and Bob measures both quadratures). The security can be viewed as resulting from kind of an information conservation law through a "fan-out" channel (leading to both Bob and Eve), akin to what is observed in the optimal estimationvs-disturbance tradeoff for coherent states [9] or in the asymmetric Gaussian cloning of coherent states [10] .
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